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Abstract: This paper considers the difficult balance to be struck be-
tween values of freedom of speech and attempts by legislators in a
range of jurisdictions to ban racially offensive speech. It compares the
position in Australia, where the High Court has established an implied
freedom of political communication, with the position in the United
States, which has enshrined freedom of speech in its Bill of Rights, and
in Canada, which has enshrined such a freedom in its Charter. After
reflecting how such provisions have been applied in the context of legis-
lative attempts to curb racially-motivated speech, the paper argues that
there are real questions over the constitutional validity of Australia’s
racial vilification laws, since they interfere with an individual’s right to
express an opinion, albeit an offensive one. This discussion takes place
in the broader context of question marks over the utility of banning
speech in an effort to improve race relations, and the marketplace of
ideas type philosophy, where it is thought that in free democracies such
as those under consideration, individuals need to be exposed to a full
range of views and opinions, in order to develop more considered views
on important topics, rather than have access to views and opinions
controlled by the government.
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I. Introduction
In 1995, an amendment was made to the Australian Racial Discrimina-
tion Act 1975 (Cth) to introduce provisions prohibiting racial vilifica-
tion. These changes have been widely lauded as reflecting Australian
multicultural society, and reflecting the harm that can be done by
speech or acts with racist overtones. While generally being a tolerant
and generally very successful multicultural society, Australia’s history
contains numerous occasions where Australia has not dealt with race
issues well, and racist attitudes and behaviours have been demon-
strated among sections of the community.1 Of course, many other
* University of Southern Queensland; e-mail: Anthony.Gray@usq.edu.au
1 Examples here include the treatment of the indigenous peoples, discriminatory
laws against Asians, particularly associated with the discovery of gold in the
second half of the nineteenth century, partly explaining the lack of an equal
protection provision in the Australian Constitution, the White Australia policy,
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countries are dealing with similar issues. The amendments may be
seen as a further attempt to grapple with such attitudes and behavi-
ours. This paper will not seek to gauge the success of legislation such
as this in achieving such a laudable aim, as opposed to other possible
public policy options that might also seek to achieve the same end. To
a constitutional lawyer, it is not relevant to constitutionality, directly at
least, to ask whether legislation is effective in achieving a stated aim,
although to the extent that proportionality is an accepted approach to
such questions, such issues may indirectly be considered. The wisdom
of legislation is typically removed from questions of constitutionality.
The purpose of this paper is to ask a different question: whether the
legislation is consistent with Australia’s status as a representative
democracy, where the High Court of Australia has found an implied
freedom of political communication. The question here is whether
restrictions on race-based speech are consistent with the implied free-
dom of political communication, in that they amount to restrictions on
speech based on its content. The paper will conclude that serious
constitutional questions arise as to the validity of content-based re-
strictions, in light of the constitutional freedom.2 These issues are
highly topical in Australia at present, with the recent successful pro-
ceeding against journalist Andrew Bolt for breaching the racial vili-
fication laws, for alleging that particular individuals who identify as
indigenous Australians had done so for lifestyle reasons. Of course,
these issues have been considered in other democracies as well, and
this paper will make extensive use of comparative materials in dis-
cussing these matters.
II. Outline of Current Australian Racial Vilification
Provision
Attempts by governments to suppress speech due to its content are
not new. One early reference is to the 1275 English statute De Scan-
dalis Magnatum, creating an offence involving spreading false news
such that discord was likely to develop between the monarch and his
or her subjects, or the ‘great’ people of the realm. Reisman notes that
during the Tudor period where royal powers grew, the Court of Star
Chamber was established to hear alleged cases of libel against the
and relatively recent legislative provisions to combat discrimination. Some argue
that the ongoing refugee debate contains hallmarks of racism, as might some
discussion around population policy. Some of these issues are alluded to by David
Partlett, ‘From Red Lion Square to Skokie to the Fatal Shore: Racial Defamation
and Freedom of Speech’ (1989) 22 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 431.
2 Marcus O’Donnell asserts that highly respected constitutional law advocate Sir
Maurice Byers QC claimed at the time of the passage of the racial vilification laws
that they were in breach of the implied right of political communication: ‘Hate
Speech, Freedom, Rights and Political Cultures: An Analysis of Anti-Vilification
Law in the Context of Traditional Freedom of Speech Values and an Emerging
International Standard of Human Rights’ [2003] University of Technology, Sydney
Law Review 1 at 13.
COMMON LAW WORLD REVIEW
168
ruling groups. The court acted, Reisman says, as a powerful support
of autocratic government, inhibiting any criticism of the reigning
powers. Amazingly enough, it was no defence to show the ‘libel’ was
true.3 The link between suppression of speech and autocratic forms of
government, and the reverse links between freedom of speech and
democratic government, has been shown over many centuries.
The key relevant Australian provision is section 18C of the Racial
Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth),4 with state equivalents.5 It makes it
unlawful for a person to do an act, otherwise than in private,6 where:
(a) The act is reasonably likely in all the circumstances to offend, insult,
humiliate or intimidate another person or group of people; and
(b) The act is done because of the race, colour, national or ethnic origin
of the other person or some or all of the group.
Section 18D creates defences dealing with something said in good
faith in making a fair comment on any event or matter of public
interest, if it is a genuinely held belief.
There has been extensive academic critique of this key provision,
focusing particularly on the vagueness of the words used, possibly
leading to subjectivity in decision making, the lack of clarification of
the extent of connection required between the act and the race etc. of
3 In the case of De Libellis Famosis, 5 Rep. 125a, the court concluded, ‘it is not
material whether the libel be true’: V. Veeder, ‘The History and Theory of the Law
of Defamation’ (1903) 3 Columbia Law Review 546–73; 4 Columbia Law Review
33–56. Lord Mansfield coined the phrase ‘the greater the truth, the greater the
libel’: David Reisman, ‘Democracy and Defamation: Control of Group Libel’ (1942)
42 Columbia Law Review 727 at 735.
4 This section relates to a provision of the International Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination which requires signatory
nations to, among other things, introduce an offence regarding the dissemination
of ideas based on racial superiority or hatred, and incitement to racial
discrimination. Australia ratified this Convention in 1975, but made a reservation
in relation to that part of the Convention, at least temporarily. This reservation
was (partly) overcome with the introduction of s. 18C but the Australian provision
is civil, rather than criminal, in character. The law was upheld pursuant to the
external affairs power in Toben v Jones [2003] FCAFC 137. See, for further
discussion, Louise Johns, ‘Racial Vilification and ICERD in Australia’ (1995)
Murdoch University Electronic Journal of Law 6. Article 20(2) of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights also requires that advocacy of national,
racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or
violence be prohibited.
5 I do not dwell here on the different provisions applying in different Australian
states; more detail is found about these in Dan Meagher, ‘So Far No Good: The
Regulatory Failure of Criminal Racial Vilification Laws in Australia’ (2006) 17
Public Law Review 209.
6 This is clarified further in s. 18C(2) to the effect that an act is not done in private if
it causes words, sounds, images or writing to be communicated to the public, is
done in a public place, or is done in the sight or hearing of people who are in a
public place. A public place is a place to which the public have access as of right
or invitation, express or implied; whether a charge is made for admission is
irrelevant: s. 18C(3).
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the victim, and the scope of the exceptions.7 The provision does not
require that the alleged wrongdoer have any malicious intent; a re-
lated point is that the concept of ‘incitement’ is missing as an in-
gredient of the section. For present purposes, it is not necessary to
dwell on these possible deficiencies in the drafting of the provision.
III. Implied Freedom of Political Communication
In a series of cases commencing in 1992, the High Court of Australia
has identified that implicit in the system of representative democracy
for which the Australian Constitution provides in ss 7 and 24 is an
implied freedom of political communication. The way in which the
freedom was expressed by all seven members of the court in Lange v
Australian Broadcasting Corporation8 has come to be recognized as
the definitive expression of the freedom:
When a law of a State or Federal Parliament or a Territory legislature is
said to infringe the requirement of freedom of communication imposed
by ss 7, 24, 64 or 128 of the Constitution, two questions must be asked
before the validity of the law can be determined. First, does the law
effectively burden freedom of communication about government or
political matters either in its terms, operation or effect? Second, if the
law effectively burdens that freedom, is the law reasonably appropriate
and adapted to serve a legitimate end the fulfilment of which is compat-
ible with the maintenance of the constitutionally prescribed system of
representative and responsible government and the procedure pre-
scribed by s. 128 for submitting a proposed amendment of the Constitu-
tion to the informed decision of the people? If the first question is
answered ‘yes’ and the second is answered ‘no’, the law is invalid.9
Such a freedom was held to be essential so that our system of repre-
sentative government was to work as intended; citizens needed to
have broad freedom to discuss ‘political’ issues, or as some called it,
7 See, e.g., Luke McNamara, Regulating Racism: Racial Vilification Laws in Australia
(Sydney Institute of Criminology: Sydney, 2002); Dan Meagher, ‘So Far So Good?:
A Critical Evaluation of Racial Vilification Laws in Australia’ (2004) 32 Federal Law
Review 225 at 228–36; ‘Regulating History: Australian Racial Vilification Law and
History Denial’ (2005) 24 University of Queensland Law Journal 499; Michael
Chesterman, Freedom of Speech in Australian Law: A Delicate Plant (Ashgate:
Aldershot, 2000); Katharine Gelber and Adrienne Stone, Hate Speech and
Freedom of Speech in Australia (Federation Press: Sydney, 2007). There is
conjecture as to how s. 18C and D work together: Bropho v Human Rights and
Equal Opportunity Commission (2004) 204 ALR 761 at 780 (per French J, claiming
that s. 18D defences limited the operation of s. 18C and were not an exception to
it). As Meagher points out, this would affect the burden of proof: ‘Regulating
History’, above at 528. To the extent that the provision makes speech illegal, the
practicalities of such restrictions can also be questioned in an era of cyber
communication.
8 (1997) 189 CLR 520.
9 Ibid. at 567–8; subsequently in Coleman v Power (2004) 220 CLR 1, four members
of the High Court agreed that the phrase ‘in a manner’ should be substituted for
the phrase in the second limb ‘the fulfilment of’: McHugh J (at 50), Gummow and
Hayne JJ (at 77–8) and Kirby J (at 82).
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‘public affairs’, to make and receive communication on these topics,
and to discuss the suitability of candidates for public office. Robust
discussion was the sign of a healthy democracy.
In reviewing the ‘political free speech cases’ in terms of specific
comments that might pertain to the specific context of what might be
alleged to be racial vilification, Mason CJ, Toohey and Gaudron JJ in
Theophanous v Herald and Weekly Times Ltd10 gave suggestions of
what ‘political discussion’ might include; one of their suggestions was
discussion of the political views and public conduct of those who are
engaged in activities that are the subject of public debate, including
Aboriginal political leaders. There is a possibility, and the author puts
it no higher than this, that speech that might fall within the above
category could be argued to be racial vilification according to the
s. 18C definition. One key consideration would be whether the offens-
ive conduct was done because of the alleged victim’s race, or whether
it occurred independently of their race. It would be difficult to sep-
arate race out of the exercise if the person is identified as an ‘Abori-
ginal political leader’. Say, for instance, that a person makes offensive
comments about an Aboriginal political leader who has expressed
views on matters such as native title, recognition of Aboriginal cus-
tomary law, the Stolen Generation or recognition of indigenous Aus-
tralians in the Constitution. It would surely be difficult to argue that
these comments were not made ‘because of’ the alleged victim’s race.
The views of the victim might have been given special prominence
precisely because they were made by someone identifying as indigen-
ous, speaking out about matters of prime importance to their
people.11
Several members of the High Court in Coleman v Power were pre-
pared to accept that insulting language could qualify as political
speech.12 Three members of the court in that case could only make an
offence around the use of such language valid by reading in a require-
ment that such language amounted to ‘fighting words’, about which
more will be said later.13 Otherwise, they would have answered the
second limb of the Lange test ‘no’.
Another important passage from the cases in this context is the
view expressed in Australian Capital Television Pty Ltd v Common-
wealth.14 In recognizing the implied freedom of political communica-
tion, and discussing how it would be applied, Mason CJ said:
A distinction should perhaps be made between restrictions on commun-
ication which target ideas or information and those which restrict an
activity or mode of communication by which ideas or information are
10 (1994) 182 CLR 104 at 124.
11 It is possible that the s. 18D defence might apply to resolve the conflict.
12 Coleman, above n. 9 at 30 (Gleeson CJ), at 45–6 (McHugh J), at 78 (Gummow and
Hayne JJ), at 91 (Kirby J).
13 Ibid., Gummow and Hayne JJ (at 78–9), Kirby J (at 87). 
14 (1992) 177 CLR 106.
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transmitted. In the first class of case, only a compelling justification will
warrant the imposition of a burden on free communication by way of
restriction and the restriction must be no more than is reasonably neces-
sary to achieve the protection of the competing public interest which is
invoked to justify the burden on communication. Generally speaking it
will be extremely difficult to justify restrictions imposed on free com-
munication which operate by reference to the character of the ideas or
information. But, even in these cases, it will be necessary to weigh the
competing public interests, though ordinarily paramount weight would
be given to the public interest in freedom of communication . . . On the
other hand, restrictions imposed on an activity or mode of communica-
tion by which ideas or information are transmitted are more susceptible
of justification . . . Whether [restrictions on radio and television broad-
casting] are justified calls for a balancing of the public interest in free
communication against the competing public interest which the restric-
tion is designed to serve, and for a determination whether the re-
striction is reasonably necessary to achieve the competing public
interest.15
The distinction made here between content-based and mode-based
restrictions has not generally16 been carried forward in subsequent
case law on the implied freedom in Australia, but bears close simil-
arity17 to the discussion of content-based restrictions discussed in
terms of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. Two
of Mason CJ’s footnotes on the same page of this discussion allude to
United States case law on the question of content-based restrictions.18
It is to that topic that the paper now turns.
15 Ibid. at 143.
16 However, Gaudron J in Levy v Victoria (1997) 189 CLR 579 at 618 noted that
judgments in ACT had distinguished between laws that were directed to political
communication ‘or content’, and laws which had other purposes but which
incidentally affected political communication. This distinction also appears in the
joint reasons in Hogan v Hinch (2011) 85 ALJR 398 at 422.
17 Eric Barendt also notes the similarity between the dictum of Mason CJ regarding
content-based restrictions and the American approach: ‘Free Speech in Australia:
A Comparative Perspective’ (1994) 16 Sydney Law Review 149 at 163.
18 These are footnotes 24 and 25 of the judgment of Mason CJ (at 143); Gaudron J (at
211) refers to the recognition in American case law of the cruciality of public
discussion in a representative democracy; McHugh J refers to American case law
on the need for voters to have full information about political candidates (at 231);
in Theophanous, above n. 10 at 130 Mason CJ, Toohey and Gaudron JJ, in
discussing the content of the implied freedom of political communication,
supported their conclusion as to its application to onerous civil and criminal
liability provisions by referring to American case law on the First Amendment (at
130–1, 133–4). Deane J in that case claimed (at 168) that the contrast between
rights protection in the United States and Australian Constitutions ‘cannot be
pushed too far’. In relation to another aspect of representative government, the
right of an individual to attend the seat of government, members of the High
Court in R v Smithers ex parte Benson (1912) 16 CLR 105 referred to relevant
American cases such as Crandall v Nevada (1867) 6 Wall 35—Griffith CJ (at 108–9),
and Barton J (at 109): ‘the reasoning of the Supreme Court of the United States in
the case of Crandall v Nevada . . . is as cogent in relation to the Constitution of
this Commonwealth as it was when it was applied to the Constitution of the
United States’. (To be clear, of course, the High Court in the 1912 decision did not
speak of this right in terms of the implied freedom of political communication,
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IV. United States Case Law on Freedom of Speech
Some justification may be required for resort to the American case
law on freedom of speech, in casting some light on the meaning of the
Australian equivalent. The First Amendment applies to speech gener-
ally, while the Australian provision is confined, at least at present, to
speech that is political in nature.19 This is not considered to present an
obstacle to considering in some detail how the United States Supreme
Court has interpreted the provision, when considering the Australian
‘equivalent’.
There are key parallels and similarities between aspects of the
United States Constitution and the Australian Constitution. The
founding fathers in Australia were clearly mindful of the American
document, and to a large extent drew from that document in crafting
the local version. The great jurist Sir Owen Dixon noted that the
Australian founding fathers ‘followed with remarkable fidelity the
model of the American instrument of government’.20 He referred to
differences between the Australian and American models as being
‘intangible’.21 Many specific constitutional examples may be given
of the use of American constitutional concepts in the development of
Australian constitutional law;22 in the specific context of freedom
of speech, it is admitted that the links are weaker, but there is an
obvious conceptual analogy between First Amendment questions and
first recognized in Australia in 1992, but Deane J in Theophanous, above n. 10 at
169 states that the ‘right of due participation in the activities of the nation’
(referring to Smithers) is an implication of the Constitution’s doctrine of
‘representative government’). The other judges in Smithers also expressly referred
to American authorities, albeit in a different context to representative government
(Isaacs J at 114–15, and Higgins J at 119); see also Nationwide News Pty Ltd v
Willis (1992) 177 CLR 1 at 73 (Deane and Toohey JJ). In that case McHugh J
referred to American precedent in discussing the meaning of the implied freedom
in Australia (at 103); see also references to the American law of freedom of speech
in the judgment of Gummow and Hayne JJ in Coleman, above n. 9 at 76. 
19 Eric Barendt argues the American provision is explicable on the basis of that
country’s particular history, traditional distrust of government and pioneering
spirit: above n. 17 at 157. 
20 ‘Two Constitutions Compared’ in Sir Owen Dixon, Jesting Pilate (Law Book Co:
Melbourne, 1965) 102.
21 Ibid. at 104. Several of Sir Owen Dixon’s papers, collected in Jesting Pilate include
this theme: see, for instance: ‘Two Constitutions Compared’ (above n. 20) and
‘Government Under the American Constitution’, where again he alluded to the
founding fathers imitating the American model with fidelity in many respects
(p. 106). In another paper, giving tribute to (former American Supreme Court
Chief Justice) John Marshall, he spoke of the American model as an ‘inspiration’
to the drafters of the Australian Constitution, ‘Marshall and the Australian
Constitution’, ibid. at 167; and in a tribute to (former American Supreme Court
Justice) Felix Frankfurter, Sir Owen Dixon noted that ‘to Australia no small part of
the constitutional law of the United States must be of first importance’: ibid. at
180. 
22 These include federalism itself, representative government, formal separation of
powers in the Constitution, enumeration of specific heads of power of the federal
government in the Constitution, implied immunities and reserved powers
reasoning (at least, until Amalgamated Society of Engineers v Adelaide Steamship
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questions arising from the implied freedom of political communica-
tion, such that discussion of the latter is well informed by discussion
of the former. Further, the American system of democracy has much
in common with the Australian system of democracy in terms of its
stability and relatively long duration, free and fair election process,
the broad franchise, and representative nature of the democracy and
political actors.23
It is acknowledged here that the American position on freedom of
speech differs greatly from the position in other jurisdictions, particu-
larly Europe, where racial vilification bans have survived human
rights-based challenges. Such bans in Europe are particularly under-
standable in light of history, obviously including World War II, though
their utility in preventing or discouraging genocide or lesser race-
based hostility is open to question given that they were in existence in
the 1930s in Germany.24 The constitutional links are considered to be
Co Ltd (1920) 28 CLR 129), the notion of judicial review according to a written
Constitution (Marbury v Madison 5 US 137 (1803), expressly adopted in Australian
Communist Party v Commonwealth (1951) 83 CLR 1 at 263 (Fullagar J), the
‘reasonably appropriate and adapted’ method of assessing the constitutional
validity of a law (Marshall CJ in McCullough v Maryland 4 Wheat 316 at 421
(1819), applied in cases such as Commonwealth v Tasmania (1983) 158 CLR 1,
Australian Communist Party v Commonwealth (1951) 83 CLR 1). Sir Owen Dixon
paid tribute to the influence of the great American jurist on Australian
constitutional development: ‘Marshall and the Australian Constitution’ in Jesting
Pilate above n. 20 at 166–79; trade and commerce power/commerce clause (G.
Winterton, H.P. Lee, A. Glass and J.A. Thomson, Australian Constitutional Law:
Commentary and Materials, 2nd edn (Thomson Lawbook Co: Sydney, 2007) 172;
Leslie Zines, The High Court and the Constitution, 4th edn (Butterworths: Sydney,
1997) 55, referring to the ‘United States provision, from which the Australian
position was clearly taken’; Anthony Gray, ‘Reinterpreting the Trade and
Commerce Power’ (2008) 36 Australian Business Law Review 29); freedom of
interstate trade (the High Court used American jurisprudence in Betfair Pty Ltd v
Western Australia (2008) 234 CLR 318; Anthony Gray, ‘State Based Business
Licensing and Section 92 of the Constitution’ (2009) 14(2) Deakin Law Review 165);
guarantees (such as they are) of trial by jury (where the High Court in Cheatle v
The Queen (1993) 177 CLR 541 at 556 alluded to their expectation that the
Australian framers intended to carry over any settled interpretation of the
American provision); freedom of religion (Adelaide Company of Jehovah
Witnesses Inc v Commonwealth (1943) 67 CLR 116 at 127 (Latham CJ)); right to a
fair trial (Dietrich v The Queen (1992) 177 CLR 293); and just terms (Dixon J in
Andrews v Howell (1941) 65 CLR 255 at 282 refers to the American equivalent).
23 Of course, there are differences, including the republican model in the United
States compared with the constitutional monarchy in Australia, direct election of
the leader of the executive in the United States, stricter separation between the
executive and legislature in that country, and a voluntary voting system there.
However, in essence the representative nature of the system of government is
clearly evident in each, perhaps even more so in the United States with some
election of public officials other than members of Congress and the President.
24 This point was noted by the dissenting judges in Keegstra, and will be elaborated
upon further later in the paper. See also Anne Twomey, ‘Laws Against Incitement
to Racial Hatred in the United Kingdom’ (1994) 1(1) Australian Journal of Human
Rights 235; R. Delgado, ‘A Shifting Balance: Freedom of Speech and Hate Speech
Regulation’ (1992) 78 Iowa Law Review 737 at 745.
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much stronger between the United States and Australia than between
Europe and Australia,25 justifying extended consideration of the
United States position, though conceding that it is vastly different to
the jurisprudence in other parts of the world.
The starting point in summarizing the American First Amendment
freedom of speech jurisprudence is the repeated affirmation of the
fundamental nature of free speech in a democratic system of govern-
ment. In Board of Education v Barnette26 the court noted:
If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no
official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics,
nationalism, religion or other matters of opinion or force citizens to
confess by word or act their faith therein. If there are circumstances
which permit an exception, they do not now occur to us.27
It sums up the rationale well in Cohen v California:
The constitutional right of free expression is powerful medicine in a
society as diverse and populous as ours. It is designed and intended to
remove governmental restraints from the arena of public discussion,
putting the decision as to what views shall be voiced largely into the
hands of each of us, in the hope that the use of such freedom will
ultimately produce a more capable citizenry and more perfect polity and
in the belief that no other approach would comport with the premise of
individual dignity and choice upon which our political system rests . . .
To many, the immediate consequence of this freedom may often appear
to be only verbal tumult, discord, and even offensive utterance. These
are, however, within established limits, in truth necessary side effects of
the broader enduring values which the process of open debate permits
us to achieve. That the air may at times seem filled with verbal caco-
phony is, in this sense not a sign of weakness but of strength. We cannot
lose sight of the fact that, in what otherwise might seem a trifling and
annoying instance of individual distasteful abuse of a privilege, these
fundamental societal values are truly implicated.28
25 Of course, there were very strong links between the United Kingdom and
Australia, but of course the United Kingdom is just one member of the European
Union, and the European Court of Human Rights has dealt with the issue of racial
vilification laws drawn from different parts of the Union.
26 319 US 624 (1943).
27 Ibid. at 641–2. The court noted that ‘there is no such thing as a false idea.
However pernicious an opinion may seem, we depend for its correction not on
the conscience of judges and juries but on the competition of other ideas’: Gertz v
Robert Welch Inc 418 US 323 at 339–40 (1974); ‘if there is any principle of the
Constitution that more imperatively calls for attachment than any other, it is the
principle of free thought’ (United States v Schwimmer 279 US 644 at 654 (1929)
(Holmes J, dissenting); Justice Cardozo in Palko v Connecticut referred to it as the
matrix and indispensable condition of nearly all other freedoms (302 US 319 at
327 (1937)).
28 403 US 15 at 24–5 (1971); Holmes J talked in Abrams v United States 250 US 616
(1919) about the marketplace of ideas as a test of truth.
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It has referred to the ‘breathing space’ required by First Amendment
jurisprudence requiring that citizens tolerate insulting and outra-
geous speech.29 Speech concerning public affairs is not merely self-
expression, but the essence of self-government.30 Speech on public
issues is on the highest rung of the hierarchy of First Amendment
values, warranting special protection.31
The court has noted that order should not be secured through fear
of punishment, and that suppression of thought is hazardous, because
repression itself breeds hatred, and hatred threatens stable govern-
ment. The solution is said to be the ability to discuss grievances.32
Justices Black and Douglas in New York Times claimed that repre-
sentative democracy would not exist if constituents could be re-
strained from speaking, writing or publishing their opinions on any
public measure, or on the conduct of those advising or executing the
measure.33 The court has been impressed with arguments based on
the ‘free trade of ideas’ being protected by the First Amendment, even
if the ideas are distasteful to many people.34 The freedom has even
been extended to the advocacy of the use of violence or breach of the
law, provided the advocacy was not likely to lead to incite imminent
lawless action.35
A key variable in deciding whether speech enjoys First Amendment
protection has been whether the regulation is content-based. It is
much less likely that a content-based restriction on speech would be
found consistent with the First Amendment protection:
Above all else, the First Amendment means that government has no
power to restrict expression because of its messages, its ideas, its
subject matter or content . . . To permit the continued building of our
politics and culture, and to assure self-fulfilment for each individual,
our people are guaranteed the right to express any thought, free from
29 Hustler Magazine Inc v Falwell 485 US 46 at 56 (1988).
30 Garrison v Louisiana 379 US 64 at 75–6 (1964).
31 Connick v Myers 461 US 138 at 145 (1983).
32 New York Times Co v Sullivan 376 US 254 at 270 (1964), citing Whitney v California
274 US 357 at 375–6 (1927) (Justice Brandeis).
33 New York Times, above n. 32 at 297. The court in this case referred to the
‘profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues
should be uninhibited, robust and wide open’ (at 270).
34 Abrams, above n. 28 at 630 (Holmes J, dissenting); ‘if there is a bedrock principle
underlying the First Amendment, it is that the government may not prohibit the
expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or
disagreeable’ (Texas v Johnson 491 US 397 at 414 (1989)).
35 Brandenburg v Ohio 395 US 444 (1969) (the conviction of the defendant, a member
of the Ku Klux Klan, was overturned; the defendant burned a large wooden cross
at a rally and used remarks such as ‘bury the n. . .’, ‘the n. . . should be returned to
Africa’, and ‘send the Jews back to Israel’. The Supreme Court ruled the law
under which he was charged to be inconsistent with the First Amendment
freedom. In contrast, the court in Virginia v Black 538 US 343 (2003) found that a
law banning the burning of a cross, if it were proven that the action was taken
with an intention to intimidate, would be lawful. (The court in this case did strike
down that part of the law to the effect that cross burning was presumed to be
evidence of an intention to intimidate.)
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government censorship. The essence of this forbidden censorship is
content control.36
The court’s greater scrutiny of bans on speech or communication
based on content has led, for example, to successful challenges to
regulations prohibiting picketing if the picketing was about a particu-
lar issue,37 to a ban on a movie because of its allegedly immoral
messages,38 to a ban on a display within 500 feet of a foreign embassy
of a sign tending to bring the foreign government into public dis-
repute.39 It has meant that an action for tort for intentional infliction of
emotional distress based on a church picket at the funeral of a naval
officer could not proceed, because the speech conveyed by the signs
at the picket was protected by the First Amendment.40 It has led to the
striking down of a law criminalizing the sale of depictions of animal
cruelty on the basis that the restriction was drawn in an overbroad
way.41 A content-based restriction would need to serve a compelling
state interest in order to be valid.42
The court has recognized a ‘fighting words’ exception to the First
Amendment, allowing regulation of speech if it is likely to lead to an
immediate breach of the peace.43 However, such an exception has
been progressively tightened, not being applied to a case involving
36 Police Department of the City of Chicago Et Al v Mosley 408 US 92 at 95–6 (1972);
‘under our Constitution the public expression of ideas may not be prohibited
merely because the ideas are themselves offensive to some of their hearers’: Street
v New York 394 US 576 at 592 (1969); Watts v United States 394 US 705 at 708
(1969) refers to a ‘profound national commitment to the principle that debate on
public issues should be uninhibited, robust and wide open, and that it may well
include vehement, caustic and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks’. This has
some links with the famous footnote 4 in the United States Supreme Court
decision in United States v Carolene Products 304 US 144 at 154 (1938) where the
court stated that restrictions on political processes which might be expected to
bring about the repeal of undesirable legislation could be subjected to greater
judicial scrutiny. Here, content-based restrictions on political discussions could be
within this category. See further: Anthony D’Amato, ‘Harmful Speech and the
Culture of Indeterminacy’ (1991) 32 William and Mary Law Review 329; Susan
Williams, ‘Content Discrimination and the First Amendment’ (1991) 139 University
of Pennsylvania Law Review 616; and Geoffrey Stone, ‘Content Regulation and the
First Amendment’ (1983) 25(2) William and Mary Law Review 189.
37 Police Department of the City of Chicago, above n. 36.
38 Kingsley International Pictures Corp v Regents of the University of the State of New
York 360 US 684 (1959).
39 Boos, Waller and Brooker v Barry 485 US 312 (1988).
40 This included signs such as ‘Thank God for Dead Soldiers’, ‘God Hates Fags’, and
‘America is Doomed’: Snyder v Phelps 131 S Ct 1207 (2011).
41 United States v Stevens 130 S Ct 1577 (2010).
42 Boos, Waller and Brooker, above n. 39. Examples have been the banning of child
pornography, upheld against a First Amendment challenge in New York v Ferber
458 US 747 (1982), a criminal prosecution for espionage for a person distributing
leaflets opposing the military draft (Schenck v United States 249 US 47 (1919)) or
for burning a military registration certificate to make the same point (United
States v O’Brien 391 US 367 (1968)).
43 Beauharnais v Illinois 343 US 250 (1952) (restrictions on the distribution of a leaflet
expressing negative sentiment towards African-American people, seeking to
discourage further movement of African-American people to the area, upheld on
this basis, against a First Amendment challenge).
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the wearing of a swastika in a strongly Jewish community.44 A further
example of this is the leading case of RAV, Petitioner v City of St Paul,
Minnesota,45 involving the petitioner’s action in allegedly burning a
cross in the yard of an African-American family. He was charged with
a breach of a city ordinance proscribing placing a symbol, object or
graffiti on public or private property where the perpetrator knew or
should have known it was likely to arouse anger, fear etc. among
others on grounds such as race, creed or religion. The court invalid-
ated the city ordinance because it was impermissible to regulate
speech or communication based on hostility or favouritism to the
underlying message expressed.46 By singling out speech that had a
connection with race, creed or religion, the ordinance discriminated
against communication based on the message it conveyed. The ordin-
ance had been drafted to rely on the ‘fighting words’ exception but the
court said that it was not available here because the law sought to
limit speech based on the viewpoint it expressed, which was un-
acceptable even in this context.47
V. Canadian Case Law on Freedom of Expression
It is also instructive to consider Canadian case law on this topic. The
High Court of Australia in the Australian Capital Television Pty Ltd v
Commonwealth48 decision expressly49 referred to the precedent of the
Canadian Supreme Court in recognizing as implicit in the British
North America Act 1867 (Imp) freedom of speech or communication,50
to support the recognition of an implied freedom of political commun-
ication. There are possible analogies between the Canadian two-step
44 The Village of Skokie v National Socialist Party of America 373 NE 2d 21 (1978)
(Supreme Court of Illinois) (in other words, that speech was protected by the First
Amendment).
45 505 US 377 (1992); Akhil Amar, ‘The Case of the Missing Amendments: RAV v City
of St Paul (1992) 106 Harvard Law Review 124.
46 505 US 377 at 386 (1992).
47 Ibid. at 393–4; see also Terminiello v Chicago 337 US 1 (1949) (successful challenge
to city ordinance forbidding a breach of the peace, which applied to a petitioner
who made a speech accusing certain racial groups of acting contrary to the
general welfare).
48 (1992) 177 CLR 106.
49 Ibid. at 140 (Mason CJ, in the first paragraph he wrote under the heading
‘Implication of a Guarantee of Freedom of Communication on Matters Relevant to
Public Affairs and Political Discussion’); other discussions of the use of the
Canadian principle in the context of the Australian implied freedom occur in
Nationwide News Pty Ltd v Wills (1992) 177 CLR 1 at 48–50 (Brennan J), at 74
(Deane and Toohey JJ); see also Theophanous, above n. 10 at 125 (Mason CJ,
Toohey and Gaudron JJ). Again, in contrast, some judges have expressly denied
the relevance of Canadian precedent (based on either implications drawn from
the British North America Act or the Charter) on the implied freedom of political
communication in Australia: Theophanous, ibid. at 162 (Brennan J).
50 This obviously pre-dated the introduction of the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms, which makes express provision for freedom of expression (s. 2(b)).
McIntyre J of the Canadian Supreme Court recognized in RWDSU v Dolphin
Delivery Ltd [1986] 2 SCR 573 at 583 that: ‘freedom of expression is not . . . a
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process (which will be discussed presently) and the Lange two-step
approach in Australia. I will now discuss a fundamental Canadian
case in which the principle of freedom of expression has been con-
sidered in the context of racial vilification. In so doing I must first
concede that this case was based on the freedom of expression con-
tained expressly in the Canadian Charter, rather than the implied
freedom of political expression which had been recognized prior to
the introduction of the Charter. They do not necessarily mean the
same thing.51 Further, the Canadian cases involve the criminal con-
text, while the provisions in the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth)
do not. The Canadian system of representative government has many
similarities to that in Australia.52
In R v Keegstra,53 the Canadian Supreme Court considered the
constitutional validity of s. 319(2) of the Criminal Code (Can). The
section made it an indictable offence, punishable by imprisonment for
two years, to ‘communicate statements, other than in private con-
versation, [which] wilfully promotes hatred against any identifiable
group’.54 The accused had been charged with a breach of the Act,
creature of the Charter. It is one of the fundamental concepts that has formed the
basis for the historical development of the political, social and educational
institutions of western society. Representative democracy, as we know it today,
which is in great part the product of free expression and discussion of varying
ideas, depends upon its maintenance and protection.’
51 This was noted expressly by Mason CJ, Toohey and Gaudron JJ in Theophanous,
above n. 10 at 125.
52 Most obviously, both are longstanding and stable democracies, enjoying universal
suffrage, free and fair elections, and both are constitutional monarchies.
Differences include the compulsory nature of the vote in Australia, but this is not
thought to make consideration of the Canadian position inapt.
53 [1990] 3 SCR 697; for critique of the decision see Bede Harris, ‘Race Vilification
Laws: A Comparative Perspective’ (1999) 6 Canberra Law Review 257 at 269–75;
on somewhat similar facts the Canadian Supreme Court in Attis v Board of School
Trustees, District No. 15 [1996] 1 SCR 825 validated the removal of a teacher from
a teaching position within New Brunswick. The teacher had made publicly racist
and derogatory comments about Jewish people, including several books, letters to
newspapers, and a television interview. The court found the Board’s actions in
removing the teacher from the classroom and adopting a position that he would
be dismissed if he wrote or published anything further derogatory about Jewish
people infringed the teacher’s freedom of expression and religion; however, his
removal from a teaching position (but not the policy of termination for further
expression or publication) was justified by s. 1 of the Charter as being a
proportional response seeking to address a substantial concern in a free and
democratic society. The court found that young children were impressionable and
the teacher’s comments could undermine meaningful participation in social and
democratic decision making by Jewish people, a result antithetical to the
democratic process (at para. 61–2). The case is also considered in Luke
McNamara, ‘Criminalising Racial Hatred: Learning from the Canadian
Experience’ (1994) 1(1) Australian Journal of Human Rights 198.
54 A defence was provided in s. 319(3) where the statements made were true, made
in good faith as an opinion on a religious subject, if they were in the public
interest, for the public benefit and reasonably believed by the maker to be true, or
if made in good faith intending to point out, for purposes of removal, matters
producing or tending to produce feelings of hatred towards an identifiable group
in Canada.
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after he used various labels in relation to Jews, including ‘treacher-
ous’, ‘sadistic’, ‘money-loving’, ‘power hungry’, and ‘child killers’. He
blamed the Holocaust on the Jews, who were apparently trying to
garner sympathy. Keegstra sought to defend himself against prosecu-
tion under s. 319 by arguing that the provision was incompatible with
s. 2(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, which pre-
served freedom of belief, opinion and expression as fundamental free-
doms.55 By a 4–3 margin, the Canadian Supreme Court upheld the
constitutionality of s. 319.
Dickson CJ for the majority56 accepted that s. 319 infringed the
right to freedom of expression in s. 2(b). In so doing, the majority
noted that the type of meaning conveyed was not relevant in assess-
ing whether s. 2(b) was enlivened;57 in other words, the ‘quality’ of the
communication was not relevant in assessing whether the implied
freedom had been breached, because to do so would approach
content-based restrictions, to which the United States Supreme Court
had also expressed an aversion, if not absolute non-acceptance.58
The majority conceded that the use of strong language and social
debate, including hate-based speech, was an unavoidable part of the
democratic process. Of particular relevance to the Australian context,
given the limit of our principle here to communication that is ‘polit-
ical’ in nature, the majority also acknowledged that ‘hate propaganda
is expression of a type which would generally be categorized as “polit-
ical”’, putting it at the centre of the principle of freedom of expression
as key to the democratic process.59
However, the majority noted that hate expression could work to
undermine democratic values by showing, and encouraging, lack of
respect and dignity for members of the community simply for racial
or religious reasons.60 Hate speech could threaten the Canadian value
of equality, and the connection of targeted groups to their commun-
ity.61 The majority was also influenced62 by international instruments
such as the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination (CERD), which required signatories (including Can-
ada) to criminalize the expression of ideas based on racial hatred or
superiority, incitement to racial discrimination and race-based vio-
lence,63 and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
requiring the prohibition of advocacy of national, racial or religious
55 Section 1 of the Charter provides that the rights enshrined within it are subject to
reasonable limits prescribed by law and which can be demonstrably justified in a
free and democratic society.
56 Dickson CJ was joined by Wilson, L’Heureux-Dube and Gonthier JJ.
57 At para. [37].
58 Ibid. at para. [49], where Dickson CJ expressly acknowledged this link between
Canadian and United States jurisprudence here.
59 Ibid. at para. [71].
60 Ibid.
61 Ibid. at para. [65].
62 Ibid. at paras. [58–61].
63 Article 4(a).
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hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or vio-
lence.64 The majority stated, in response to arguments favouring
broad freedom of speech rights based on ‘marketplace of ideas’ or
‘search for truth’ principles, that there was little chance that state-
ments based on racial hatred were true, or would be likely to lead to a
‘better world’.65 Suppression of racial hatred would reduce the harm
done to targeted individuals or members of targeted groups, and to
relations between different cultural and religious groups in Canadian
society.66 The majority was fortified in its view by the fact that the
s. 319 offence applied only to ‘wilful’ promotion of hatred, interpreted
to require mens rea or intent. This significantly curbed the operation
of the section and its potential to stifle expression.67
As a result, the majority concluded that while the section did in-
fringe the freedom of expression found in s. 2(b) of the Canadian
Charter, it was saved by s. 1 as being a reasonable limit prescribed by
law in a free and democratic society.68
The dissentients agreed with the majority that content-based re-
strictions were not compatible with the freedom of expression guar-
anteed by s. 2(b) of the Charter. The extent to which the idea or
thought expressed was unpopular, offensive, distasteful or contrary to
the mainstream was irrelevant.69 The dissentients referred to the
fundamental nature of the freedom of expression in a representative
democracy, ‘freedom in thought and speech and disagreement in
ideas and beliefs, on every conceivable subject, are of the essence of
our life’,70 and the freedom upon which other freedoms depend.71
They also referred to the ‘marketplace of ideas’ and ‘search for truth’
rationales for preserving freedom of expression, contrasting such a
freedom with totalitarian societies where government propaganda
can flourish, quite removed from the real concerns of the population.72
The dissentients pointed out that during heated political debate, often
things were said that could be said to promote hatred, such as name-
calling, unflattering comparisons etc. This did not mean that such
action subverted democracy, such that it should be banned. State-
ments amounting to an expression of racial hatred were not excep-
tional in that regard.73
The other important point for the dissentients, in denying that s. 1
of the Charter justified the law, notwithstanding its infringement of
the s. 2 freedom, was the efficacy of the provisions to achieve the
64 Article 20.2.
65 At para. [70].
66 Ibid. at para. [74].
67 Ibid. at paras. [80–2].
68 Ibid. at para. [94].
69 Ibid. at paras. [132–5] (La Forest, Sopinka and McLachlin JJ).
70 Ibid. at para. [117].
71 Ibid. at para. [110].
72 Ibid. at paras. [110–11].
73 Ibid. at para. [138].
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desired end. Framing the question under s. 1 as being whether the
means—the criminal prohibition of wilfully promoting hatred—was
proportional and appropriate to the end of suppressing hate propa-
ganda to maintain social harmony and individual dignity, the answer
for the dissentients was ‘no’. They reasserted the primary importance
of freedom of expression, a first order right the existence of which
allowed other rights. The dissentients noted that this restriction was
on speech that was ‘political’ in nature,74 so that even closer scrutiny
and justification was required, lest such restrictions became a stalking
horse for state censorship. Such restrictions could have a chilling
effect on a much greater range of expression than that to which the
restriction was targeted.75
The dissentients doubted that hate speech laws such as s. 319
would effectively curb hate speech. They pointed to the experience in
Germany in the 1920s and 1930s, where hate speech laws clearly did
not prevent the rise of a dictatorship intent on genocide.76 Far from
stamping out hate speech, hate speech laws might provide more pub-
licity to the views of those who might make hate speech, making them
martyrs or, in the minds of some, victims of a government conspir-
acy.77 For these reasons, they believed that s. 319(2) was not saved by
s. 1 of the Canadian Charter.
The Canadian jurisprudence confirms that the mere fact that a re-
striction is content-based is not necessarily fatal to its constitutional
validity. If the High Court were minded to find s. 18C constitutional, it
would find support in the Canadian jurisprudence.
VI. Constitutional Arguments Against the Australian
Provisions
I turn now to consider some of the constitutional arguments about the
Australian racial hatred provisions, in the light of the Australian free-
dom of political communication. I take as a given here (as some other
commentators have)78 that comments regarding race, or about mat-
ters with a connection to race, are (or may be) broadly discussion
about ‘government or political matters’ within the first limb of the
74 Ibid. at para. [157].
75 Ibid. at para. [158].
76 Ibid. at para. [162].
77 Ibid. at paras. [160–1].
78 Dan Meagher, ‘What is Political Communication? The Rationale and Scope of the
Implied Freedom of Political Communication?’ (2004) 28 Melbourne University
Law Review 438 at 440; ‘The Protection of Political Communication Under the
Australian Constitution’ (2005) 28 University of New South Wales Law Journal 30;
Nicholas Aroney, ‘The Constitutional (In)validity of Religious Vilification Laws:
Implications for their Interpretation’ (2006) 34 Federal Law Review 287.
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Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation test.79 So, for example, a
statement that certain races are entitled to ‘too much’ government
support in Australia, or a statement about those seeking refugee
status in Australia, both of which clearly touch on race, are statements
about government or political matters. The refugee debate in Aus-
tralia, multiculturalism and indigenous affairs are clearly matters of
great political interest. If the racial hatred provisions in the Racial
Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth) were applied to prohibit some debate
on such matters, it would clearly burden freedom of communication
on such matters. The really contentious aspect of Lange would be
whether such a restriction was reasonably appropriate and adapted
to a legitimate end in a manner which was compatible with the system
of representative and responsible government for which the Constitu-
tion provides.
i. The Restrictions Are Content-Based
Clearly, s. 18C of the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth) is a content-
based restriction, prohibiting the doing of an act, including expres-
sion of a view, in public that is likely to offend or humiliate a person or
group of people, where the act is done because of that individual or
group’s race or ethnicity. Mason CJ in Australian Capital Television Pty
Ltd alluded to such laws, concluding that a ‘compelling justification’
would be required and that although a balancing of interests would be
necessary, it would be extremely difficult to justify.80
Similarly, the United States Supreme Court and Canadian Supreme
Court in the decisions alluded to above have expressed strong reser-
vations about content-based restrictions. In the United States, a com-
pelling justification for such restrictions has also been required, and
there have been very limited cases in which these have been upheld.
These have included the so-called ‘fighting words’ exception, where
the message communicated is likely to lead to an immediately violent
response. This has only been used once by the United States Supreme
Court to strike down racial vilification laws (the Beauharnais preced-
ent), and there is serious doubt that this decision remains good law.81
79 Cass Sunstein reaches the same conclusion: ‘much racist speech belongs at the
free speech core because it is a self-conscious contribution to social deliberation
about political issues’: ‘Words, Conduct, Caste’ (1993) 60 University of Chicago
Law Review 795 at 796; as does Bede Harris: ‘if (hate speech) provisions are to be
used to proscribe the expression of ideas which are offensive because they are
“racist” . . . the very concept of “racist speech” is a political one’: above n. 53 at
295.
80 (1992) 177 CLR 106 at 143; Harris reaches the same conclusion on Mason CJ’s
views: ‘the emphasis given in this dictum to the high level given to ideas
contained in expression is, I would argue, a strong indication that viewpoint
discrimination legislation is likely to be found unconstitutional’: Harris, above
n. 53 at 292; Harris concludes that by this standard s. 18C is ‘problematic’: ibid. at
293; see also Cunliffe v Commonwealth of Australia (1994) 182 CLR 272 at 299
(Mason CJ), at 389 (Gaudron J).
81 E.g. Cass Sunstein: ‘most people think that after New York Times v Sullivan,
Beauharnais is no longer the law’: above n. 79 at 814.
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It is most unlikely that racial vilification laws could be justified on the
‘fighting words’ exception, and the Australian laws are not written in
such a way as to embrace this exception (explicitly) anyway. The other
exceptions where content-based restrictions in the United States have
been permitted have been in the area of child pornography and
seditious activity. As unpleasant as racial hatred might be, it is hard to
put such behaviour in the same category as the former two, in terms
of justification for regulating speech or communication. All members
of the Canadian Supreme Court in Keegstra agreed that the content of
speech was irrelevant in determining whether it infringed the free-
dom of communication for which s. 2(b) of the Canadian Charter
provides.82
Of course, there is good reason why content-based restrictions are
frowned upon. If validated by a court, a government might use them
to influence debate in certain ways, to shut down debate on some
topics, and to favour others. This is completely contrary to the essence
of a free society, based on the fact that people have a right to air
views, and to receive a broad range of views and information about
others. It is the essence of a democracy. We are well aware of other
countries which suffer from government-controlled media and
thought suppression, and will fight to save our society from this fate.
The price of this liberty is that people may express views which we
don’t share, or views which we find abhorrent, offensive or insulting.
This price is high, but the alternative is worse.
ii. The Prohibition in the RDA Does Not Require Intent to
Racially Vilify
As has been noted by other authors, as read the Australian provisions
can be applied against a person although that person did not express
or intend hatred for the person’s race or ethnicity.83
In the leading Canadian case of Keegstra, one of the key aspects of
the racial vilification legislation which the majority hesitatingly valid-
ated against a freedom of expression challenge was the requirement
in the Act that the promotion of racial hatred be ‘wilful’, obviously
analogous to ‘intended’. In the words of the majority:
. . . the interpretation of wilfully . . . has great bearing upon the extent to
which s. 319(2) limits the freedom of expression. This mental element,
requiring more than merely negligence or recklessness as a result, sig-
nificantly restricts the reach of the provision, and thereby reduces the
scope of the targeted expression . . . this stringent standard of mens rea
is an invaluable means of limiting the incursion of s. 319(2) into the
82 At para. [37] (Dickson CJ, Wilson, L’Heureux-Dube and Gonthier JJ), at 133
(La Forest, Sopinka and McLachlin JJ).
83 Meagher, above n. 7 at 232; Luke McNamara and Tamsin Solomon, ‘The
Commonwealth Racial Hatred Act 1995: Achievement or Disappointment?’ (1996)
18 Adelaide Law Review 259 at 267.
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realm of acceptable (though perhaps offensive and controversial) ex-
pression. It is clear that the word ‘wilfully’ imports a difficult burden for
the Crown to meet and, in so doing, serves to minimize the impairment
of freedom of expression.84
Dickson CJ referred to the Law Reform Commission of Canada’s
Working Paper on Hate Propaganda, which recommended against re-
moving an intention or purpose requirement in hate legislation. It is
possible, given the majority’s expressed view here, that if the Cana-
dian provision had not been confined to ‘wilfully’ promoting racial
hatred, the majority may not have validated the provision under s. 1 of
the Canadian Charter, as being a reasonable limit justified in a free
and democratic society.85
Of course, the obvious corollary is that the absence of an intent
requirement in the Australian version means that the incursion of the
provision on freedom of political communication is greater than it
otherwise would have been. It is surely even more difficult to meet the
‘compelling justification’ requirement of Mason CJ in Australian Capi-
tal Television Pty Ltd.
iii. Compatibility With Representative and Responsible
Government
The obvious place to begin in terms of what representative govern-
ment requires is the writings of a leading proponent of the doctrine,
John Stuart Mill. Many extracts of his work On Liberty are directly
relevant for present purposes and warrant extensive quoting:
No argument, we may suppose, can now be needed against permitting a
legislature or executive, not identified in interest with the people, to
prescribe opinions to them, and determine what doctrines or what
arguments they shall be allowed to hear . . . If all mankind minus one
were of one opinion, and only one person were of the contrary opinion,
mankind would be no more justified in silencing that one person, than
he, if he had the power, would be justified in silencing mankind . . . the
peculiar evil of silencing the expression of an opinion is, that it is rob-
bing the human race; posterity as well as the existing generation; those
who dissent from the opinion, still more than those who hold it. If the
opinion is right, they are deprived of the opportunity of exchanging
error for truth; if wrong, they lose what is almost as great a benefit, the
84 At para. [82] (Dickson CJ, for the majority).
85 The decision cannot be distinguished away from the Australian situation by
claiming that the case turned on the concept of ‘intent’, often associated with
criminal proceedings (as the Canadian provisions were), in contrast with the
provisions of the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth), which are not criminal
proceedings. As evidence for this point, we should bear in mind that the Western
Australian provisions, found in the Criminal Code Amendment (Racial Vilification)
Act 2004 (WA), criminalize (s. 78) conduct likely to incite racial animosity or
harassment; intention is not required in order for the criminal provision to be
breached. As a result, one cannot dismiss the relevance of the Canadian case on
the basis it is confined to racial vilification provisions that are criminal in nature.
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clearer perception and livelier impression of truth, produced by its colli-
sion with error . . . We can never be sure that the opinion we are en-
deavouring to stifle is a false opinion; and if it were true, stifling it would
be an evil still . . . All silencing of discussion is an assumption of in-
fallibility86 . . . [Mill questioned why there was a preponderance among
humans of rational opinion and conduct, and claimed that free discus-
sion had brought this state of affairs to exist] . . . [Humankind] is capable
of rectifying . . . mistakes, by discussion and experience. Not by experi-
ence alone. There must be discussion, to show how experience is to be
interpreted. Wrong opinions and practices gradually yield to fact and
argument, but facts and arguments, to have any effect, must be brought
before it . . . the only way in which a human being can make some
approach to knowing the whole of a subject is by hearing what can be
said about it by persons of every variety of opinion, and studying all
modes by which it can be looked at by every character of mind. No wise
man ever acquired his wisdom in any mode but this . . . the steady habit
of correcting and completing his own opinion by collating it with those
of others, so far from causing doubt and hesitation in carrying it into
practice, is the only stable foundation for a just reliance on it.87
In other words, there is a fundamental value to society in allowing
individuals to express their views on matters, with few limits.88 It
allows listeners to consider issues and points of view which they
would not otherwise have considered, causing them to strengthen
their opinions on those matters, refine their views, or change their
position.89 It is the process of discussion that provides a more
86 John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism, On Liberty, Considerations on Representative
Government (Everyman Paperbacks: New York, 2002) 83–5.
87 Ibid. at 88; he went on to relate the fate of Socrates and Jesus Christ as examples
of the dangers of punishing thought and expression in society (at 92); a similar
theme is evident in the writings of: Alexander Meiklejohn, Free Speech and its
Relation to Self-Government (Harper and Brothers: New York, 1948); Wojciech
Sadurski, ‘Offending With Impunity: Racial Vilification and Freedom of Speech’
(1992) 14 Sydney Law Review 163; and Robert Post, ‘The Rule of Law: What Is It?
Democracy and Equality’ (2006) 603 Annals of the American Academy of Political
and Social Science 24. 
88 Meiklejohn, above n. 87. Kirby J noted ‘we tolerate robust public expression of
opinions because it is part of our freedom and inherent in the constitutional
system of representative democracy’: Coleman, above n. 9 at 99–100.
89 This is the marketplace of ideas argument: see Watts v United States 394 US 705 at
708 (1969); Abrams, above n. 28 at 630 (Holmes J); similarly Kirby J speaks in
Coleman, above n. 9 at 91, about insult, emotion, calumny and invective as part of
the ‘struggle of ideas’. Meagher alludes to how ‘noxious ideas or viewpoints may
further rather than undercut the advancement of historical knowledge’, but
inviting responses which otherwise may not have been forthcoming: ‘Regulating
History’, above n. 7 at 530. In lamenting a European Court of Human Rights’
decision (Otto-Preminger-Institut v Austria ECt HR, Ser A, No 295-A [1994])
upholding an Austrian ban on a film said to be offensive to Catholics, Eric Heinze
concludes ‘the court thus upholds bans on a form of expression, religious satire,
from which the very tradition of candid, rigorous debate in Europe had largely
emerged’: ‘Viewpoint Absolutism and Hate Speech’ (2006) 69 Modern Law Review
543 at 559.
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sophisticated view of matters among the populace.90 A person who
has an opinion on something based on no more than what they were
told to believe by their teacher or parent is most unlikely to be able to
defend that opinion when challenged. In contrast, a person who has
carefully considered different points of view before reaching their
opinion is in a much better position to justify and defend their opin-
ion, which is likely to be much deeper and richer as a result of their
having heard different views.91 These arguments are not here based,
as they sometimes appear elsewhere, on the notion of a ‘search for
truth’.92
Another argument focuses particularly on the ‘representative’ na-
ture of the democracy. If a politician is elected to accurately and
comprehensively reflect the collective wishes and will of his or her
constituents, it can be argued that constituents need to be able to
express their true views, without fear or favour. This might include
opinions on matters including race that others might find to be offens-
ive. Arguably, this tends to reflect the incompatibility of freedom of
speech restrictions with the representative nature of our political
process.
The second limb of the Lange principle considers whether the laws
are ‘reasonably appropriate and adapted’ to achieving a legitimate
end. It may be conceded immediately that prevention of discrimina-
tory treatment of an individual based on race or ethnicity, and the
pursuit of a successful multicultural society with mutual respect, toler-
ance and dignity for others is a legitimate end to which legislation
might be directed. However, is s. 18C reasonably appropriate and
adapted to achieving this end?
Several authors have focused on the pain and damage caused by
racist speech. It has been argued that such speech can cause long-
term psychological impact on those at whom it is targeted.93 Some
90 Some authors refer to this as self-realization: see, e.g. Lawrence Solum, ‘Freedom
of Communicative Action: A Theory of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech’
(1989) 83 NorthWestern University Law Review 54 at 80; and Maurice Redish, ‘The
Value of Free Speech’ (1982) 130 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 592.
91 This view is sometimes expressed as the ‘marketplace of ideas’ argument; e.g.
Holmes J in Abrams, above n. 28 at 630, said that the ‘ultimate good desired is
better reached through free trade in ideas—that the best test of truth is the power
of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market’; in other
words, there is no such thing as a false idea: Gertz, above n. 27 at 339. 
92 As Dan Meagher acknowledges, ‘“truth” is in today’s postmodern world very
much a contested proposition’: ‘Regulating History’, above n. 7; cf e.g. Mill, above
n. 86 at 85–8, references to finding ‘truth’ in justifying free discussion.
93 Mari Matsuda, ‘Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim’s Story’
(1989) 87 Michigan Law Review 2320; Richard Delgado, ‘Words That Wound: A
Tort Action For Racial Insults, Epithets, and Name-Calling’ (1982) 17 Harvard Civil
Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review 133; T. Massaro, ‘Equality and Freedom of
Expression: The Hate Speech Dilemma’ (1991) 32 William and Mary Law Review
211; Anne Flahvin, ‘Can Legislation Prohibiting Hate Speech Be Justified in Light
of Free Speech Principles?’ (1995) 18 University of New South Wales Law Journal
327; Stefanou Haag, ‘Antiracism: From Legislation to Education’ (1994) 1
Australian Journal of Human Rights 185; Robert Post, ‘Racist Speech, Democracy
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have described the damage caused as ‘spirit murder’.94 For these
authors, the restrictions on hate speech are thus justified in order to
minimize these impacts. Others argue that hate speech is inconsistent
with fundamental values such as tolerance, respect for others and
inclusion, and that it may have the effect of ostracizing certain groups
from political and social discussion, such that the banning of it is
consistent with representative democracy.95 As one example,
Mahoney states ‘it is hard to imagine how the unhindered, wilful
promotion of group hatred could be characterized as either elemental
to the structure of democracy, or an advancement in the protection of
freedom’.96 There is some evidence of this in the Lehideux and Isorni v
France decision,97 where the European Court of Human Rights stated
that ‘like any other remark directed against the Convention’s under-
lying values, the justification of a pro-Nazi policy could not be allowed
to enjoy the protection afforded by Article 10’.98
However, in the author’s view there are several difficulties with this
argument. In saying this, it is not sought to downplay the pain which
some victims of racial vilification may feel about what someone else
has said. It is acknowledged that some speech within the category of
racial vilification may be extremely hurtful to those to whom it is
directed.
Firstly, there is the slippery slope argument—there are many things
that one person might say that might be hurtful to another, or a group
of others. A person might say things about people with red hair,
people with freckles, tall people, short people, people who are of
above average weight, those of below average weight, those who are
intelligent, those who are not intelligent, those who like particular
music bands, those who like particular movies, those who support
particular political parties, members of a particular profession, those
of a particular sexuality, those with larger ears, those with larger
noses etc. Statements made on any or all of those things could also be
extremely hurtful and, in some cases, cause emotional harm. Yet, no-
one suggests that these comments can or should be banned in a
democracy.99 Thomas Jefferson’s adage about our freedom depending
and the First Amendment’ (1991) 32 William and Mary Law Review 267 at 271–7.
Frederich Schauer says that the costs of free speech are borne disproportionately
by racial minorities: ‘Uncoupling Free Speech’ (1992) 92 Columbia Law Review
1321 at 1322.
94 Patricia Williams, ‘Spirit Murdering the Messenger: The Discourse of
Fingerpointing as the Law’s Response to Racism’ (1987) 42 Miami Law Review
127. 
95 Post, above n. 93 at 300–17; David McGowan and Ragesh Tangri, ‘A Libertarian
Critique of University Restrictions of Offensive Speech’ (1991) 79 California Law
Review 826 at 842; McNamara and Solomon, above n. 83 at 283–6. 
96 Kathleen Mahoney, ‘Hate Vilification Legislation and Freedom of Expression:
Where is the Balance?’ (1994) 1(1) Australian Journal of Human Rights 353. 
97 ECt HR, [1998] VII ECHR 90.
98 Ibid. at para. 53.
99 D’Amato, above n. 36.
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on the liberty of the press (free speech), and that this liberty cannot be
limited without being lost, is apposite here.100 How is it justifiable to
single out vilification speech based on race for special treatment,
while leaving other types of vilification speech unregulated? Similarly,
if speech is to be banned because it is inconsistent with society’s
values, it is impossible to draw acceptable boundaries. As Heinze
says, some of what was written by philosophers including Aristotle,
Plato, Marx and Nietzsche could also be argued to be contrary to
today’s fundamental values, yet no-one is seriously calling on a ban of
such works.101
The price we pay for democracy is that some people will exercise
this right in an irresponsible way, but the solution for this is not
(should not be) to ban someone saying it.102 Inherent in democracy is
that there be a robust exchange on a whole range of contentious
issues; in some ways there is irony in the very body symbolizing the
views of the people seeking to act to suppress certain views.103 The
court has noted that:
. . . the people in our democracy are entrusted with the responsibility for
judging and evaluating the relative merits of conflicting arguments . . . if
there is any danger that the people cannot evaluate the information and
arguments advanced (during the course of public debate), it is a danger
contemplated by the Framers of the First Amendment.104
Sometimes, particularly in the political arena, comments may be ill-
informed, nasty, offensive, hurtful, or unfair.105 As Kirby J says in
Coleman, freedom of expression ‘belongs as much to the obsessive,
emotional and the inarticulate as it does to the logical, the cerebral
and the restrained’.106 The response to concerns expressed that race
100 As Strossen puts it, ‘history demonstrates that if the freedom of speech is
weakened for one person, group or message, then it is no longer there for others’:
Nadine Strossen, ‘Regulating Racist Speech on Campus: A Modest Proposal’
(1990) Duke Law Journal 484 at 536.
101 Heinze, above n. 89 at 565. He says that movies such as Gone With the Wind and
Breakfast at Tiffany’s would need to be banned also because of their racial
stereotyping and racist caricatures, respectively (at 563).
102 Cass Sunstein makes a similar point: ‘a good deal of public debate involves racial
or religious bigotry or even hatred, implicit or explicit. If we were to excise all
such speech from political debate, we would severely curtail our discussion of
such important matters as civil rights, foreign policy, crime, conscription,
abortion and social welfare policy. Even if a form of hate speech is involved, it
might well be thought a legitimate part of the deliberative process . . . it bears
directly on politics. Foreclosure of such speech would probably accomplish little
good’: above n. 79 at 815.
103 Post, above n. 93 at 285; McGowan and Tangri, above n. 95 at 856; Barendt, above
n. 17 at 161; cf C. Lawrence, ‘If He Hollers Let Him Go: Regulating Racist Speech
on Campus’ (1990) Duke Law Journal 431. 
104 First National Bank v Bellotti 435 US 765 at 791–2 (1978).
105 ‘The language of the political arena . . . is often vituperative, abusive and inexact’:
New York Times, above n. 32 at 270; ‘From its earliest history, Australian politics
has regularly included insult and emotion, calumny and invective, in its armoury
of persuasion. They are part and parcel of the struggle of ideas’: Coleman, above
n. 9 at 91.
106 Coleman, above n. 9 at 100.
189
RACIAL VILIFICATION AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH IN AUSTRALIA AND ELSEWHERE
hate speech is not fundamental to the structure of democracy or an
advancement in freedom protection is that it is not for the govern-
ment to decide what speech is acceptable and what speech is not. It
doesn’t justify censorship.
If it is thought that banning someone from saying something will
stop them from thinking it, it is considered unlikely to be the case. For
example, in Australia’s recent past some politicians have made com-
ments that might be perceived to be negative about indigenous Aus-
tralians, or about the level of Asian immigration. It is unlikely that
charging such a person with a breach of the racial vilification laws for
such comments will stop the person from holding such views, or
others from holding such views.107 Voltaire’s idea is apposite here, of
supporting the right of that person or anyone else to express such a
view, even if I vehemently disagree with the remarks made. Kirby J in
Coleman v Power refers to the ‘counterproductive’ attempts to sup-
press opinion.108
One concrete piece of evidence to support this argument is to con-
sider that there were laws in Germany in the 1920s and 1930s forbid-
ding racial vilification, as the Canadian Supreme Court noted in the
Keegstra decision.109 Clearly, these laws did not stop the attempted
genocide of a race of people. While it is always dangerous to general-
ize from extreme examples, it does cause us to question carefully the
perceived benefit of racial vilification laws, compared with their im-
pact on fundamental rights in a democratic system of government. It
is also possible that prosecutions for alleged racial vilification will be
counterproductive, giving the alleged offender publicity for their
views, making them a martyr in the minds of some, and leading others
107 Sadurski makes the same point: ‘racists are there, and it is better to let them air
their views in the open rather than allow an illusion to grow that the problem has
been solved because racist statements have been made illegal . . . by prohibiting
public statements that vilify those groups we may slightly reduce the hurt to the
feelings of their members, but at the same time we risk removing the issue of
racism from the public agenda’: Sadurski, above n. 87 at 193. Catharine
Mackinnon has similarly concluded there is no evidence that ‘consumers’ of racist
propaganda are more likely to commit aggression against the target of the racist
comments: Only Words (Harvard University Press: Cambridge, MA, 1993) 62. See
also Strossen: ‘there is no persuasive psychological evidence that punishment for
name-calling changes deeply held attitudes. To the contrary, psychological studies
show that censored speech becomes more appealing and persuasive to many
listeners merely by virtue of the censorship’: above n. 100 at 554 (citing studies
like: S. Worchel and S. Arnold, ‘The Effects of Censorship and Attractiveness of
the Censor on Attitudinal Change’ (1973) 9 Journal of Experimental Social
Psychology 365, and T.C. Brock, Erotic Materials: A Commodity Theory Analysis of
Availability and Desirability, Technical Report of the United States Commission on
Obscenity and Pornography (1971) 131–2).
108 Coleman, above n. 9 at 99.
109 Para. 162; see also A. Borovoy and K. Mahoney, ‘Language as Violence vs
Freedom of Expression: Canadian and American Perspectives on Group
Defamation’ (1989) 37(2) Buffalo Law Review 337 at 344. Others have made the
same point about the United Kingdom anti-vilification laws and their failure to
stop active neo-Nazi groups: Aryeh Neier, Defending My Enemy: American Nazis,
the Skokie Case and the Risks of Freedom (Dutton: New York, 1971) 154–5.
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to suggest conspiracy theories involving the government.110 Reflect-
ing on the experience in Europe, Anne Twomey notes:
In the United Kingdom, during every review of the racial hatred legis-
lation, the allegation is made that the legislation has failed and must be
amended because racist material and racist violence is increasing,
rather than decreasing. The experience of places where racial hatred or
vilification legislation has been enacted, such as the United Kingdom,
Northern Ireland, former Yugoslavia and Germany, shows that it will
not have the effect of eliminating racial hatred, and if we expect it to do
so, we too will be disappointed and consider our legislation to have
failed. While racial vilification legislation may have the effect of remov-
ing from circulation some of the more virulent and offensive racist
literature it may also result in the production of more sophisticated
racist propaganda, couched in moderate and persuasive tones, as has
occurred in the United Kingdom. If the aim of racial vilification legis-
lation is to punish racists and racist organisations, we may also be
disappointed. Experience in the United Kingdom has again shown that
many of the most notorious racists are capable of avoiding conviction
under such legislation, and that it is often members of minority groups,
who do not have the same access to legal advice, who are caught by the
legislation.111
Further, in considering the extent to which the law is reasonably
appropriate and adapted to a legitimate end the fulfilment of which is
compatible with representative and responsible government,112 the
existence of alternative measures less invasive of human rights to
meet this legitimate end, and questions of proportionality between the
invasion and the corresponding benefit, are considered relevant.113
The author does not deny that racism, including racist speech, is a
110 Heinze, above n. 89 at 552.
111 ‘Laws Against Incitement to Racial Hatred in the United Kingdom’ (1994) 1(1)
Australian Journal of Human Rights 235; Delgado also found that evidence of
racism in Europe had substantially increased while racial vilification laws were in
place: above n. 24 at 745.
112 Aleardo Zanghellini concludes that racial hatred speech restrictions are not
compatible with the requirements of representative and responsible government:
‘Jurisprudential Foundations for Anti-Vilification Laws: The Relevance of Speech
Act and Foucauldian Theory’ (2003) 27 Melbourne University Law Review 458 at
485.
113 In the specific context of the implied freedom of political speech, the High Court
of Australia has referred, as a criterion of validity, to the question whether ‘there
were other less drastic means by which the objectives of the law could be
achieved’: Lange, above n. 8 at 568 (Brennan CJ, Dawson, Toohey, Gaudron,
McHugh, Gummow and Kirby JJ). Questions of proportionality were also
important in the Supreme Court of Canada decision in R v Keegstra [1990] 3 SCR
697 (in the context of the Charter). In other constitutional contexts, examples of
the High Court of Australia’s use of proportionality principles in assessing validity
include Betfair, above n. 22 at 479 (Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Kirby, Hayne, Crennan
and Kiefel JJ) (s. 92) and Commonwealth v Tasmania (1983) 158 CLR 1 at 266–7
(Deane J); Richardson v Forestry Commission (1988) 164 CLR 261 at 317 (Deane J)
(both s. 51(29)). See also the discussion of ‘proportionality’ in Australian
constitutional law in Justice Susan Kiefel, The Use of Constitutional Supra
Principles by Judges, VIII World Congress, International Association of
Constitutional Law 2010, 10 December 2010. 
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problem in Australia, as it is in many other countries. However, other,
arguably more effective, ways exist to tackle such an issue, including
effective education of the community on such matters, government
policies that bring different groups in society together, organization
of multicultural festivities and events etc. If racism thrives on ignor-
ance and fear, the answer is to tackle those issues head-on, not to stop
the manifestation of racism, racist speech. Of course, it is not for a
constitutional lawyer to tell the government which policy option is
best to tackle a problem; however, these matters are considered rele-
vant in considering the application of ‘reasonably appropriate and
adapted’ and ‘proportionality’ principles in this context.
Some of the judgments in Coleman v Power can also be utilized in
support of an argument that a ban on racist hate speech may not be
considered by some judges to be ‘reasonably appropriate and
adapted’ and consistent with representative democracy within the
Lange test. For instance, Gummow and Hayne JJ (with whom Kirby J
agreed)114 validated the provisions in that case, but that was only
because they confined the provisions to prohibiting insulting, abusive
or threatening words that were likely to provoke a physical response.
In other words, this was very similar to the ‘fighting words’ exception
allowed by the United States Supreme Court in Chaplinsky v New
Hampshire115 case, and to which Gummow and Hayne JJ expressly
alluded in their judgment. Though they made this decision on the
basis of statutory interpretation, they found it was ‘reinforced’ by
the Lange principles.116 They were satisfied that, as read by them, the
relevant legislation was confined to ‘fighting words’, limits on which
were appropriate and adapted to a legitimate end of keeping public
areas free of violence.117 They went on to say that if the Act were not
so read, and was read ‘in terms of ensuring the civility of discourse,
the very basis of the decision in Lange would require the conclusion
that an end identified in that way could not satisfy the second of the
tests articulated in Lange’.118
Given that the relevant provision of the Racial Discrimination Act
1975 (Cth) dealing with racial hatred acts is not confined to ‘fighting
words’, surely the implication from Gummow and Hayne JJ in Cole-
man is that they would not conclude that it satisfied the second limb of
the Lange test. It must be acknowledged, however, that no member of
the court in this case expressly adopted a distinction between restric-
tions that were content-based and those that were not, or indicated a
two-tier level of scrutiny, with content-based restrictions viewed more
suspiciously. This was in the context of the law in Coleman which
clearly was a content-based restriction.
114 Coleman, above n. 8 at 87.
115 Chaplinsky v New Hampshire 315 US 568 (1942).
116 Ibid. at 77.
117 Ibid. at 78.
118 Ibid. at 79.
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iv. The Section 18D Qualification
Section 18D of the Act creates a qualification119 to s. 18C, allowing
anything said or done reasonably and in good faith, where it is (a) a
statement, publication, discussion or debate for any genuine aca-
demic or other genuine purpose in the public interest, or (b) in making
a fair comment on any event or matter of public interest, if the com-
ment is an expression of a genuine belief held by the person. The
question is whether this s. 18D exception to s. 18C saves the latter
section from being found to be incompatible with the implied freedom
of political communication.120 One commentator has expressed doubt
that it does.121
There have been relatively few cases that have considered this mat-
ter, and none at the High Court of Australia level. In a single judge
decision, Jones v Scully,122 Hely J of the Federal Court considered a
racial vilification complaint against a person who expressed doubt
over the veracity of the Holocaust and claimed it had been used to
garner sympathy, suggested that Jewish people control pornography
and were trying to control the world and involved in several conspira-
cies. In denying that s. 18D applied, Hely J stated:
I am not satisfied that in distributing this leaflet, the respondent was
acting either reasonably, or in good faith. The leaflet employs sensation-
alised findings which place the blame for pornography upon Jews per
se . . . The other reasons are not stated, but it is implicit in the article that
the fact that a person is a Jew is a sufficient reason for not allowing the
person to settle in America. The leaflet vilifies Jews because they are
Jews, and for that reason its distribution is neither reasonable nor in
good faith.
Hely J accepted that the respondent believed what she was saying but
this was not sufficient to attract the s. 18D defence, because he found
the publication was not ‘reasonable and in good faith’. In so conclud-
ing, he stated that:
. . . if as the respondent says available information only casts doubt on
the accepted version of the Holocaust, then distribution of a leaflet
119 It has been stated that the true nature of the section is a qualification to the s. 18C
provision, rather than an exception to it: Bropho v Human Rights and Equal
Opportunity Commission and Another (2006) 135 FCR 105.
120 In Jones v Scully (2002) 120 FCR 243, Hely J found that s. 18C (with the s. 18D
exception) were reasonably appropriate and adapted to a legitimate objective
consistent with representative government (the Lange test) (at 306); see also Catch
the Fire Ministries Inc and Others v Islamic Council of Victoria Inc and Another
(2006) 206 FLR 56.
121 ‘It is debatable . . . whether communication needs to be reasonable or in good
faith in order to enjoy the protection of the implied freedom of political
communication’: Aroney, above n. 78 at 315.
122 Jones v Scully, above n. 119 at 286. Section 18D was not raised by the respondent
in Jones v Toben [2002] FCA 1150 and the Federal Court found the onus of proof
was on the respondent to do so (para. 101). In any event, the court was not
satisfied that the ‘good faith’ requirement had been established. The context was
an organization claiming that the Holocaust was exaggerated and that Jews were
seeking to garner sympathy with their claims.
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conveying the imputation I have found is neither reasonable nor in good
faith.123
Hely J concluded in this paragraph that the respondent may have
intended to vilify Jews with her material, and if that was her intention,
then reasonableness, good faith and genuineness of purpose could
not be established.124
What the author considers to be a narrow approach to the s. 18D
exemption was again taken in Toben v Jones.125 There members of the
Full Federal Court denied that the exemption could apply to similarly
distasteful comments about the Jewish people. Carr J found the ex-
emption did not apply, because ‘in the context of knowing that Aus-
tralian Jewish people would be offended by the challenge the
appellant sought to make, a reasonable person acting in good faith
would have made every effort to express the challenge and his views
with as much restraint as was consistent with the communication of
those views’. Similarly in Bropho v Human Rights and Equal Opportu-
nity Commission and Another, French J (then of the Federal Court)
claimed that the fact that the person believed what they were saying
was not enough to attract s. 18D; in addition, ‘objectively viewed,
[they must have] taken a conscientious approach to advancing the
exercising of that freedom, in a way that is designed to minimize the
offence or insult, humiliation or intimidation suffered by people af-
fected’.126 These views were adopted and applied by Bromberg J in
the recent decision of Eatock v Bolt.127
With respect, as a general observation the above comments sug-
gest that some courts have found it difficult to ignore the content of an
expression, or the way in which it was said, in deciding whether it
was made ‘reasonably and in good faith’. To reiterate, no doubt many
of the comments referred to above were extremely hurtful to mem-
bers of society, and we might have wished that those expressing those
views had not done so, or done so in different terms. But our dis-
agreement with the way in which views were expressed cannot
(should not) be the determinant of whether or not a person’s right to
express the view is constitutionally protected or not.128 The fact that
the s. 18D qualification has been interpreted in this way by some
lower courts reinforces, in the author’s view, rather than denies, the
incompatibility of the racial vilification regime established in the
123 Jones v Scully, above n. 119 at 293.
124 Ibid.
125 [2003] FCAFC 515 at 528 (with whom Kiefel J (at 534) and Allsop J (at 555)
agreed).
126 Bropho, above n. 118 at 133.
127 [2011] FCA 1103 (28 September 2011), paras 348–9.
128 The words of Kirby J in Coleman, above n. 9 at 91 (an implied freedom of political
communication case) spring to mind here: ‘one might wish for more rationality,
less superficiality, diminished invective and increased logic and persuasion in
political discourse. But those of that view must find another homeland. From its
earliest history, Australian politics has regularly included insult and emotion,
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Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth) with the implied freedom of
political communication.
VII. Conclusion
Provisions in the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth) are vulnerable
to a constitutional challenge based on the implied freedom of political
communication. The freedom, drawn from the principle of represent-
ative democracy for which the Constitution provides, is fundamental
in nature. In this light, restrictions on speech based on content must
be subject to strict scrutiny, and courts in other jurisdictions have not
generally favoured content-based restrictions. Validity here opens the
door to validity in other contexts, such that the freedom of commun-
ication inherent in any functioning democracy is under threat. Apply-
ing the Lange test, comments or acts referring to racial issues or a
person’s race could well be ‘political’ speech within the first Lange
limb. As to their possible justification as being reasonably appropriate
and adapted to a legitimate end compatible with representative gov-
ernment, it is hard to reconcile the need for open debate with content-
based restrictions. The price to be paid for a robust democracy is that
sometimes individuals will say things that are unpleasant, hurtful,
unfair or offensive, but we live with this because the alternative, that
of government control over what can be said, is worse. There is no
justification for singling out vilification based on race for special treat-
ment, as opposed to many other kinds of vilification. Based on experi-
ences elsewhere, government attempts at thought control or
expression control in the race area are very unlikely to achieve their
desired ends, and may well have unintended consequences, and when
the cost in terms of loss of free speech and debate is so high, the
legislation cannot be said to be reasonably appropriate and adapted
to a legitimate end consistent with representative government.
calumny and invective, in its armoury of persuasion. They are part and parcel of
the struggle of ideas . . . By protecting from legislative burdens governmental and
political communications in Australia, the Constitution addresses the nation’s
representative government as it is practised. It does not protect only the
whispered civilities of intellectual discourse.’
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